IMPLICATIONS –After that high drama of a secret meeting between President Noynoy and MILF Chair Al Haj Murad and the smoke somehow settles down, we must look closely at its implications. Sure, it was a “coup” of sorts with no less than the President as principal player. Even the usually alert Malacanang press even failed to sniff the air about the trip. Yes, it was fascinating and full of symbolism. It was also a bold move — unprecedented and unconventional. After the meeting, no doubt it was a high media event that woke up everyone to the fact that indeed, government is determined to find a political solution to a long pestering problem.

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RISKS -- But that Tokyo parley is equally so full of risks. First of all, getting the President no less to meet the highest official of a rebel group while negotiations are still on going is “not in the books”. Meaning, no negotiator worth his salt will put in jeopardy the high office of the presidency and throw caution to the wind by resorting to that secret caper unless it has some strategic consideration. That is still unknown to the public. We hope this will be publicly disclosed — or known — soon.

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‘THE PRINCIPAL –In peace negotiations, the President is called the “principal” and he stays above the fray, so to speak, while the peace panel or his peace adviser shields him from the vagaries of a complicated and bruising process. Normally, he publicly comes in only when the issues are settled and as head of state he presides over the ceremonies and formalities of a settlement.

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HANDS ON –But don’t get me wrong there. This is not to say that the President should keep his hands off the process. On the contrary, the president as “principal” personally calls the shots and gives the strategic directions. He must intervene and give the marching orders when the negotiators need a judgment call. Behind the scene, he must track the whole process closely. In fact, even before negotiators leave for some meeting, the “principal” is briefed every step of the way, to the last detail, and options are presented to him. He knows the ” minimum and maximum ” negotiating parameters. We call this the “mini max” of peace talks.
But this is done internally, away from the public view, behind closed doors. I am witness to this with former Presidents Ramos and Arroyo. I am tempted to disclose some events but I will just leave it at that for the moment.

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LAST CARD? –Just like in other crisis situations , the negotiator allows a “buffer” to give him some leeway and although he may be in close touch with the higher authority who can make decisions on some demands , or perhaps he has already the full authority to make judgment calls himself , he operates as a go-between and maintains a “cushion” of sorts. This is axiomatic in every similar situation: you keep your “big guns” or your aces for last. You play your last card only when there’s no other card to play. Otherwise you are recklessly mishandling your game.

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MALAYSIA --It is important to immediately point out that the one-on-one meeting has a significant implication with Malaysia’s role as facilitator in the talks. We cannot deny the fact that certain sectors in government had previously been publicly expressing “discomfort” over Malaysia’s “capture” of the Philippine peace process. My assessment is that the Tokyo meeting has “short-circuited” the facilitation process and there is more opportunity now for both sides to directly deal with each other and not be constrained by the facilitation protocols in place. I find this a positive development. And I’m sure Malaysia will not mind.

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CRUCIAL STAGE –No doubt, the negotiations with the MILF is now at a crucial stage. Let us not forget that the MILF has already submitted its draft of a final comprehensive agreement. It has practically “laid all its cards on the table”. For example, the MILF made clear that its bangsamoro aspiration can be adequately addressed only if a “state, sub-state” governance set-up is achieved in the bangsamoro homeland. Mark this important note: this can be done only if the Philippine constitution is accordingly amended.

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NO SECESSION -- Also important to note is that the MILF even gave up its alleged “secession” plans, a “maximum” in the MILF’s “mini max” negotiating card. If you look closely at the MILF draft, there is nothing there anymore about a “self determination” process where the bangsamoro, after several years of transition after a settlement is achieved, will be asked to take a vote as to their final decision. To experts, this is a window or door to secession or independence. This provision, I have to stress again, is no longer in the MILF draft. Please note also that the Philippine government has NOT submitted yet its own draft up to now. My guess is that the Tokyo meeting must have something to do with the delay in the government’s submission. I can understand why!

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AMENDMENT –Let me state categorically: there is no other way but a constitutional route to adequately address the bottom line MILF position of a “state substate” setup. It is best that this is made clear at the outset. We must amend the Philippine constitution, if we grant this. But then, the Aquino administration has also repeatedly said publicly that it is not in favor of amending the constitution, that it is not a priority. On the other hand, I also know that the ARMM set-up, even though how “improved or enhanced” is not acceptable to the MILF. These two positions are irreconcilable.

If the President’s trip to Tokyo resolves, or at the very least for the moment softens this impasse, then it is worth the perceived risks.

But if for one reason or another this will not be so, then that Tokyo secret meeting was a blunder and a “reckless adventurism” that unduly put on the spot the Presidency of the Republic. It may even hasten an early return to the war front. God forbid! (dureza.jess@gmail.com)

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